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Not Guilty? Another Look  
at the Nature and Nurture of Economics Students 
 
 





In this paper, we examine students’ attitudes towards various allocation mechanisms for a 
scarce resource. For this purpose, we have run a survey among officers of the German 
military who are enrolled in different courses of study (such as economics) at the University 
of the German Federal Armed Forces. We find that significantly more economics than non-
economics students judge price increases as fair. Moreover, this tendency strengthens as 
economics students advance in their studies. In addition, fewer advanced economics students 
judge allocation through the local community as fair when compared to first-year economists 
or other students. These results stand in contrast to results obtained by Frey, Pommerehne and 
Gygi (1993) on exactly the same survey. In summary, we find evidence for both nature and 
nurture effects. 
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1 Introduction 
Whether economists are different from other individuals and if so, whether these differences 
are due to their nature or nurture has been the subject to a far reaching debate among 
economists at least since Marwell and Ames (1981). They found that economics students tend 
to be less cooperative than students from other disciplines. While there appears to be some 
consensus that economists behave differently in many experiments and also tend to hold 
different views and attitudes than other individuals, there is much less agreement on the 
sources of these differences.1
Quite a number of economists apparently hold the view that economics students are initially 
not much different, but that they become different over the course of their studies (see Frank, 
Gilovich and Regan 1993, 1996). According to Frey and Meier (2001), this “indoctrination 
hypothesis” and the according evidence seem “to have convinced most of the academic 
community.” If this view is correct, it may be somewhat of a tragedy from an ethical point of 
view since we know that cooperation and mutual trust are often beneficial for society as a 
whole as cooperation saves on transaction costs and helps to overcome market failure in many 
instances (see Arrow, 1970; Fukuyama, 1995). If economics really makes students less 
cooperative, one is also left to wonder about the social benefits of teaching economics. 
A related debate is not directly concerned with economists’ behaviour, but with their personal 
values (see, e.g., Gandal and Roccas, 2002). While there is some agreement again about the 
very issue that economists tend to hold different values than non-economists (see, e.g., Frey, 
1986), there is much less consensus whether this is due to economists’ nature or their nurture.  
In fact, many economists plea for “not guilty” in this context. As is argued, “economists are 
born, not made” (Carter and Irons, 1991). According to the “self-selection hypothesis” 
economics students are already more selfish and more convinced of market forces before they 
start studying economics. More precisely, the argument is that economics students 
deliberately choose to study economics because they are already different or have different 
views than other students (see Carter and Irons, 1991, or for a recent corroboration Frey and 
Meier, 2001, 2002).2 If this alternative view is correct, teaching economics does not make 
students “bad citizens”; they are “naturally born economists”.  
The plea for “not guilty” may be somewhat surprising, as it implies that the (more or less) 
intensive study period of several years has no major effect on the students’ value system. This 
would be in line with the crystallization thesis of Hess and Torney (1967), which postulates 
that values are determined in one’s first 13 years of life and that these values remain, to a 
large extent, stable thereafter. At least most sociologists tend to reject this view of value 
formation as being too simplistic and static. Instead it is argued that one’s (political) 
socialization is an ongoing process (Hurrelmann, 2002). This would also be consistent with 
Becker’s (1996) model of man’s values and attitudes, according to which values and attitudes 
result from ongoing investment in human and social capital. According to these models, 
university education should have a strong impact on one’s values, and differences in 
education should lead to different value sets.  
                                                 
1   However, it is not even clear whether economists are really more selfish and less cooperative, as Marwell 
and Ames (1981) and others have suggested. For example, Yezer, Goldfarb and Poppen (1996) find in 
their experiment that economics students are more cooperative than students from other disciplines. 
2   Other studies supporting this view are Cadsby and Maynes (1998) and Frank and Schulze (2000). 
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Among economists, Stigler (1959, p.528) has been an exemplary advocat of the “learning” or 
“indoctrination” hypothesis, as he states that, regarding economists’ attitudes, “the main 
reason for the conservatism [of economists] surely lies in the effect of the scientific training 
the economist receives. He is drilled in the problems of all economic systems and in the 
methods by which a price system solves these problems.” Again, while there is also some 
empirical support for this hypothesis (see, e.g., Scott and Rothman, 1975, Soper and Walstad, 
1983), there is also empirical support for the counter hypothesis that differences are mainly 
due to selection effects (see Frey, Pommerehne and Gygi, 1993). 
More precisely, Frey, Pommerehne and Gygi (1993) have surveyed three different groups 
about their views about price increases and other allocation mechanisms. The first group 
consisted of a random telephone book selection from the general population, the second group 
of students in introductory economics classes at three different universities in Germany and 
Switzerland, and the third group consisted of advanced economics students. While the authors 
found differences between economists and the general population, they did not find much 
difference between first-year and advanced economics students.  
There are, however, a number of problems with the above study as Frey, Pommerehne and 
Gygi (1993) could not control for (expected) income, the level of education, and other 
demographic factors such as gender, nationality and age - all of which may be quite different 
between economics students and the general population.  
Hence, in order to check the robustness of the above results we have run almost exactly the 
same survey conducted by Frey, Pommerehne and Gygi (1993) among officers of the German 
military who are enrolled in various courses of study (such as economics) at the University of 
the Federal Armed Forces (U FAF) in Hamburg, Germany. A survey among this group has 
the advantage that we do not need to control for (expected) income, education level, gender, 
nationality or age, as the students are extremely homogeneous in these respects.  
The question how attitudes towards different allocation mechanims are shaped may not only 
be important for shedding more light on economic education, but also be useful for 
understanding the often observed aversion towards market-based allocation mechanisms. This 
is important as policy reforms are, in practice, not only judged on efficiency grounds, but also 
under fairness aspects, which are usually less well understood by economists. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 explains the survey design and the 
data obtained, before our results are presented and analysed in section 3. The fourth section 
briefly discusses framing effects, and section 5 concludes. 
 
2.   Survey Design and Data 
Our survey has been conducted among officers of the German Armed Forces who were 
enrolled at the U FAF. These students have to commit themselves to the German military for 
12 years in order to be allowed to study for 3-4 years at the U FAF. While the U FAF is 
exclusively open to students who are also officers of the German military, the courses taught 
and the degrees granted are exactly the same as at German civil universities. That is, students 
can study education, history, political science, mechanical and electric engineering, and also 
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business and economics. The courses are not specific for the military, and the content does 
not differ from many other universities.3
In order to compare our results in this setting to those of Frey, Pommerehne and Gygi (1993), 
we have asked almost exactly the same question as they did in their survey,4 namely: 
At a sight-seeing point, reachable only by foot, a well has been tapped. The bottled water 
is sold to thirsty hikers for 2 Euro per bottle. The maximum daily production are 100 
bottles. On a particularly hot day, 200 thirsty hikers are expected. Please judge the 
following measures for allocating the water among the thirsty hikers: 
(a) The price is increased to 4 Euro per bottle. 
(b) Selling the water for 2 Euro per bottle to the first 100 hikers according to “first 
come, first served”. 
(c) Selling the water for 2 Euro per bottle to the 100 hikers whose last name by 
chance happens to start with the letters A to K. 
(d) The local community buys all bottles for 2 Euro per bottle and distributes them as 
it sees fit. 
(e) Selling half-sized bottles for 1 Euro per bottle to all hikers (one bottle per hiker 
only). 
The idea behind this question is that while a price increase tends to be efficient in such a 
situation as it allocates the scarce resource to the hikers with the most intensive wants,5 
economics is presumed not to teach us anything about the fairness of various allocation 
mechanisms. 
The survey was conducted in the autumns of 2000, 2001 and 2002 among 527 students who 
were asked to indicate, for each allocation mechanism, whether they find the proposed 
measure “completely fair”, “acceptable”, “unfair” or “very unfair”. In addition, students were 
asked to give a number of personal and social details such as their major study course, years 
of study already completed, a self-assessment of their political position (ranging on a scale 
from 0 for the extreme (political) left to 100 for the extreme (political) right) and their 
regional provenance, i.e. the federal state (or Bundesland) where they graduated from high 
school. In addition, a subsample of 206 students was also asked to indicate their age. 
We received 505 usable responses that contained all the data that we requested. Among the 
usable responses 311 were from economics, business and business engineering students 
(“economists”) and 194 from other students (other social sciences and engineering). Of the 
311 economists, 166 were first year students surveyed in their first week of class, and 145 
were more advanced economics students. 
                                                 
3   The underlying idea of the U FAF is to make it more attractive for young people to join the military for 
12 years by offering them a university education and an according degree which is useful for the officers 
when they leave the military after 12 years. 
4   We have added a question about rationing as allocation mechanism (e), which was not included in the 
original survey conducted by Frey, Pommerehne and Gygi (1993). 
5   Note that the question is not about a life-threatening situation and the price is comparatively low so that 
income effects or income differences should not matter much in this case; especially as income levels are 
not expected to differ much in our sample. Also, while the proposed price increase may ensure static 
efficiency we do not imply anything about dynamic adjustment affects. 
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The students surveyed were all male, and the 206 students asked for their age were between 
20 and 27 years old. The median age was 23, and less than 10 percent were either younger 
than 21 or older than 25. Among all respondents 272 students had graduated from high school 
in West German states while 208 went to high school in East Germany. The remaining 25 
students are from Berlin.  
Regarding the students’ political position the average rating was 61.1 with a median of 60. 
The left-most fifth of all students indicated that their position was 50 or lower, while the 
right-most fifth indicated it was 75 or higher. Hence, students tend to cluster slightly right 
from the centre as one might expect at a military university.6
 
3. Results 
3.1 Descriptive Data Analysis 
Table 1 summarises the survey results for all respondents as well as for various subgroups. 
Among all subgroups, rationing is considered “completely fair” or “acceptable” by a large 
majority, which exceeds 90 percent in all cases. The random procedure on the other hand is 
considered the least fair measure for allocating the water. There also appears to be somewhat 
of a consensus regarding the first-come, first-served principle, which is considered fair by 
more than two thirds in all groups.  
 
Table 1: Respondents Who Judge a Mechanism "Completely Fair" or "Acceptable" 
Group n  (a)  Price 
Increase 
(b) 1st come, 
1st served 
(c) Random (d) Local 
Community 
(e) Rationing 
All Respondents  505  41.6%  (210) 73.7% (372) 9.7% (49) 43.4%  (219) 94.5% (477) 
Economists 311  49.8%  (155) 73.6% (229)  8.4% (7) 39.2%  (122) 94.9% (295) 
Advanced Economists  145  60.0%  (87)  69.0% (100) 9.0% (13) 34.5%  (50)  93.8% (136) 
1st year Economists  166  41.0%  (68)  77.7% (129) 7.8% (13) 43.4%  (72)  95.8% (159) 
Business Students  236  45.8%  (108) 73.7% (174) 8.1% (19) 41.5%  (98)  93.6% (221) 
Economics Students  46  69.6%  (32)  71.7% (33) 2.2%  (1)  41.3%  (19) 97.8% (45) 
Non-Economists 194  28.4%  (55)  73.7% (143) 11.9% (23) 50.0%  (97)  93.8% (182) 
Other Social Scientists  132  22.0%  (29)  68.9% (91) 11.4% (15) 44.7%  (59) 93.9% (124) 
Engineering Students  62  41.9%  (26)  83.9% (52) 12.9% (8)  61.3%  (38) 93.5% (58) 
West  Germans  272  43.8%  (119) 78.3% (213) 11.8% (32) 41.5%  (113) 94.9% (258) 
East Germans  208  39.4%  (82)  69.2% (144)  8.2%  (17) 45.2%  (94)  94.7% (197) 
Most Left-wing 20%  101  35.6%  (36)  79.2% (80) 8.9%  (9)  53.5%  (54) 92.1% (93) 
Most Right-wing 20%  101  51.5%  (52)  69.3% (70) 9.9%  (10) 45.5%  (46) 95.0% (96) 
 
The main disagreements appear to exist over the fairness of price increases and community 
allocation. While only 22 percent of other social scientists and 28.4 percent of all non-
economists find a price increase fair or acceptable, 41 percent of first year economists and 
even 60 percent of advanced economists consider a price increase fair or acceptable. χ
2-tests 
indicate that all these differences are significant at the 99 percent level.  
                                                 
6   Note, however, that we do not know whether the distribution within the overall population would be 
much different. 
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It is also interesting to note that there does not appear to be a major difference in views 
between first year economists and engineering students while there is (already) a major 
difference between first year economics students and other social scientists. This indicates 
that both nature and nurture impact on economists’ views regarding the fairness of the price 
mechanism.7 Furthermore, we find that within the economics profession, more students who 
study pure economics tend to consider the price mechanism just when compared to business 
students. While almost 70 percent of the students in pure economics find a price increase fair 
or acceptable, only 45.8 percent of all business students hold this view. 
Regarding community allocation we find that overall more economists tend to favour a price 
increase over community allocation. The difference, however, is driven by the advanced 
economists, as in fact slightly among the first year economists more students find community 
allocation fair than a price increase. This again points towards nurture effects, as students 
learn about the perils of state intervention and Government failure.  
In contrast to the economists, among non-economists more respondents find a community 
allocation fair or acceptable than a price increase. While this holds for both engineering and 
non economic social sciences students, among the engineering students more respondents find 
both a price increase (41.9%) and community allocation (61.3%) just. While the difference 
between first-year economists and other social scientists is negligible, there is a significant 
difference between them and the advanced economists. 8
Overall, it appears that economists tend to naturally like the market, but this preference is 
nurtured over the course of their study. In addition, economics students apparently become 
more sceptical regarding local community allocation. 
 
3.2 Comparison with Frey, Pommerehne and Gygi (1993) 
In Table 2 we compare our results (HJ) with those obtained by Frey, Pommerehne and Gygi 
(1993) (henceforth: FPG) in the survey they conducted in 1987. As can be easily seen, our 
results differ markedly form theirs, even though some results correspond. Like FPG we find a 
ranking from fairest to most unfair from first-come, first-served over price increase to 
community allocation and random among economists and a ranking from first-come, first-
served over community allocation to price increase and random among non-economists. 
However, many other findings are different, as can be easily seen from Table 2.  
Somewhat surprisingly, FPG report significantly fewer advanced students considering a price 
increase to be fair when compared to first-year economics students, which they interpret, 
together with results of some other surveys they conducted, as evidence in favour of the self-
selection and against the indoctrination hypothesis. In contrast, we find that an increasing 
number of economics students find a price increase fair, as they advance in their studies. FPG 
also find that more advanced students tend to find a random or administrative allocation 
                                                 
7   While we have only 16 advanced other social scientists in our survey, which does not allow for a robust 
comparison between first year and advanced students in other social sciences, we have 30 first year 
engineering students and 32 advanced ones. In both groups 13 students find a price increase fair or 
acceptable which represents 43.3 and 40.6 percent, respectively, which is an insignificant difference. 
8   A summary of various χ
2-tests is given in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
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mechanism fair than first-year students,9 while in our survey advanced and first-year students 
do not differ much in their judgements about (the unfairness of) a random procedure. 
However, in our study fewer advanced students find an administrative allocation mechanism 
fair, which points towards nurture effects.  
 











Study  HJ  FPG HJ FPG HJ FPG HJ FPG 
Advanced Economists  60.0%  49% 69.0% 64%  9.0%  38%  34.5%  49% 
1st year Economists  41.0%  65% 77.7% 68%  7.8%  18%  43.4%  38% 
Population/Others  28.4%  27% 73.7% 76% 11.9% 13% 50.0% 42% 
 
One possible explanation for these differences may be that FPG have only a comparatively 
small sample of advanced economics students with n=45 (and n=105 first-year economics 
students) – even though this sample should be large enough for statistic testing. Another 
factor is that times may have changed since FPG conducted their survey in 1987. The general 
view towards Government and/or the dominating economic ideology in classrooms may have 
changed since 1987. Also, as universities enjoy freedom of teaching, there might exist strong 
differences between economic faculties – or even between teachers within the same faculty - 
concerning the content and “ideology” in class. Finally, FPG conducted (an unknown) part of 
their survey in Switzerland, which may explain differences in students' attitudes toward local 
community allocation, especially when they learn about the benefits of direct democracies.  
 
3.3  Cultural Influences and Political Attitudes 
In order to control for other factors such as the students’ origin and their political attitude, let 
us compare both the value judgements of East versus West German students and the left-most 
versus the right-most quintile. As various studies have indicated, there may still be significant 
differences between East and West Germans’ attitudes (see Ockenfels and Weimann, 1999; 
Suhrcke, 2001). In our survey, however, we only find differences in East and West German 
students’ views regarding the fairness of the first-come, first-served principle, where the 
fraction of West Germans considering such an allocation fair is larger than the corresponding 
number of East Germans (see Table 1). In particular, differences in view about the price 
mechanism or community allocation are not significant. The difference in East and West 
German students’ view about the fairness of the first-come, first-served principle may 
possibly be due to the experience East Germans had to make with queuing.  
Given the results obtained by Ockenfels and Weimann (1999), the finding that East and West 
German students do not differ much in their views may be somewhat unexpected. However, 
an explanation may be that students at the U FAF are extremely homogeneous in terms of 
their disposable income and their career expectations, independent from whether they are 
originally from East or West Germany. In contrast, the students examined by Ockenfels and 
                                                 
9   FPG (1993) speculate that there may be some learning effects regarding random allocation mechanisms, 
as economics students learn about the efficiency of lotteries (see, e.g., Boyce, 1994). 
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Weimann (1999) at various East and West German universities probably differ with respect to 
their disposable income and their career expectations.10
We did, however, find differences in opinion between the left-most and the right-most 
students. While the right-most fifth of the students surveyed, whose average political attitude 
is 81.7, prefer a price increase over community allocation, the reverse is true of the left-most 
fifth, whose average political attitude is 40.0. In addition, to the differences in fairness 
judgements regarding price increases (35.6 versus 51.5 percent) and local community 
allocation (53.5 versus 45.5 percent), there is also a difference regarding the first-come, first-
served principle, which is judged fair or acceptable by 79.2 percent of the left-most students, 
but only by 69.3 percent of the right-most ones. A possible explanation may be that first-
come, first-served and other queuing devices tend to favour low income groups within the 
population (also see FPG, 1993, p.277).11
 
3.4 Regression  Analysis 
In order to single out the different factors that appear to shape students’ judgements about the 
fairness of various mechanisms, we have run binary logit regressions for all the five proposed 
allocation mechanisms. As explanatory variables we have used students’ political attitude and 
dummy variables for (a) West German students, (b) first-year economists and (c) advanced 
economists. To correct for heteroscedasticity we estimate robust standard errors using White's 
method. The results are summarised in Table 3. 
The regression results indicate that there are selection or “nature” effects, as being a first-year 
economist already increases the likelihood of finding a price increase fair or acceptable. 
However, the likelihood increases even further when students are advanced economists. In 
addition, being an advanced economist also increases the likelihood of finding local 
community allocation unfair or very unfair. Hence, the logit regression indicates there are 
also learning or “nurture” effects. 
As expected after looking at the descriptive analysis in section 3.3, we cannot find differences 
between East and West German students regarding their judgements about a price increase or 
community allocation. The only differences concern the first-come, first-served principle and 
the random mechanism, where more West Germans tend to find the mechanisms fair. As 
mentioned, this may possibly be due to the negative experience East Germans had with non-
price allocation mechanisms until unification. As the students’ age in our samples ranges 
from 20 to 27 most of them should have gathered vital experience before 1989. In addition, 
students from East Germany have been socialized within environments where memories 
about non-price allocation mechanisms are still vivid.  
                                                 
10   Moreover, one may speculate that the students we are examining are now all living in Hamburg , i.e. in 
West Germany, while the students examined by Ockenfels and Weimann still live in the East, so that the 
differences they established may also be due to these differences. Note, however, that the vast majority of 
the first-year students in our sample have only been living in Hamburg for one week when we conducted 
the survey so that it appears rather unlikely that their moving to Hamburg already had an impact on their 
views. 
11   However, we have to be rather carefull here, as the “left” quintile is actually more a centrist group and 
not a typical leftist group of people. At the same time, the right-wing does not always opt for free 
markets; actually the extreme right often prefers strong Governments to promote other, non-economic 
objectives. 
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Table 3: Binary Logit Regression12
Endogenous 
Variable 
























































In parentheses z-ratios based on heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors,  
* (**) [***] significant at 90% (95%) [99%]-level. 
 
Maybe more surprisingly, students' political attitude does not add any explanatory power, 
given their course of study and the years completed. Hence, we have checked whether 
economists are possibly more right wing in general than other students, and, indeed, the 
economists' average political attitude (62.7) is significantly different from other students' 
average political attitude (58.5). Similarly, the average attitude of students finding the price 
mechanism fair or acceptable is 63.2 is significantly different from the value for the students 
who find the price increase unfair or very unfair (59.7). In addition, first-year economists 
appear to be less right-wing (60.9) than advanced economists (64.8). Hence, economists may 
not only favour the price mechanism, but also become more conservative as Stigler (1959) 
already suspected. Nevertheless, the regression results suggest that both nature and nurture 
effects cause economists to be different.13
 
4. Framing  Effects 
In a third sample, the initial survey was varied for another group of 267 students in order to 
test the robustness of our results with respect to potential framing effects. In this survey, the 
price system was not compared with alternative allocation mechanisms. Instead students were 
only asked how they evaluate a price increase, but not how they rate other allocation 
mechanisms. As one may expect, the general tendency among all subgroups was that fewer 
respondents found the price increase unfair or very unfair. In fact, the level of approval for a 
price increase rises by around 15 to 20 percent in all groups if fewer alternatives are 
mentioned.  
The results of this second survey are summarised for a variety of subgroups in Table 4.  
 
                                                 
12   The reported results do not differ qualitatively to those of a binary probit regression. For a comparison 
see the respective results in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
13    We have also estimated ordered logit and ordered probit regressions. Again the results confirm our 
analysis. The respective results for the endogenous variable "price increase" are reported in Table A3 in 
the Appendix. 
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Table 4: χ
2-test for framing effects 











1st-year Economists (1) vs.  





Advanced Economists (1) vs.  





East German Economists (1) vs.  





West German Economists (1) vs.  





Other Social Scientists (1) vs.  





In survey (1) participants were confronted with all five allocation mechanisms; while in survey (2) 
they were only asked to judge about the price increase. 
 
Hence, while the levels of approval tend to rise, the systematic differences in approval rates 
that we have observed between the different student groups persist even if students are not 
confronted with alternative allocation procedures.14 This is reassuring for our conclusion that 
first of all economists are different and that secondly, while economists are already different 
when they begin their studies, they tend to be nurtured over the course of their economic 
studies. That is, studying economics does not seem to be without impact on students’ fairness 
judgements regarding the price system and Government allocation, once they have decided to 
become trained economists. In view of the socialization theories we also reject the strong 
crystallization thesis of Hess and Torney (1967).  
 
5  Summary and Conclusion 
In general we can conclude that, based on our results, both nature and nurture are significant 
in explaining economists’ views regarding the price mechanism and community allocation. 
These results stand in contrast to Frey, Pommerehne and Gygi (1993) who find that there are 
no nurture effects, but that economists’ different views can be entirely ascribed to selection 
effects.  
Four reasons immediately spring to mind that may partly explain these different findings. 
Firstly, since the students we have surveyed are part of the military and used to hierarchical 
relations where they have to obey orders, they may possibly be more susceptive to 
“indoctrination” when compared to other students. Secondly, there may also be different 
teaching methodologies, and the contents and emphases may differ between different 
universities and university teachers. Thirdly, times have changed between the two surveys, 
and so may have economics students. Fourthly, Frey, Pommerehne and Gygi (1993) have not 
controlled for other demographic factors such as nationality, income expectations, gender or 
age, which may have affected their results. Whatever the reasons for the different findings 
                                                 
14   In yet another sample, our story was varied in that the sales booth did not sell tapped water, but soft 
drinks and beer. We did not find significant differences in the results between these two cases though. 
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are, our results indicate that the pure selection hypothesis cannot easily be generalised. At 
least some students’ value judgements appear to be affected by studying economics. 
Overall, our study would reject the hypothesis that training in economics does not affect 
students’ judgement about what is fair and unfair, i.e. that we as academic economists are 
“not guilty”. However, since there are also selection effects, indicating that economics 
students already hold different views than others when beginning their studies, we can claim 
that our students’ views are not entirely “our fault” as economics teachers either. In addition, 
it should be noted that obviously we cannot deduce economics students’ behaviour (whether 
this is more or less cooperative or selfish than that of other students) from their attitude 
towards various allocation mechanisms. 
Regarding future research it may be interesting to analyze other factors that affect students’ 
attitudes towards various allocation mechanisms. For example, if students’ values depend to a 
large degree on their socialisation agents it could be interesting to control a similar survey for 
parents’ jobs, business and income, as these may play a crucial role for the students’ 
attitudes.. Furthermore, students may react differently in different social contexts. To give an 
example, students may hold different views about an increase in prices for consumer goods 
when compared to an increase in wages. In our view, these issues may be interesting topics 
for further research. 
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Appendix 
Table A1:  χ
2-test for differences in approval rates for price increases and community 
allocation for various subgroups 
  Price Increase  Local Community 
 Approval  Rate  χ
2-test 
(significance) 
Approval Rate  χ
2-test 
(significance) 


















































East German Economists vs. 









Left-wing (lowest 20%) vs. 










Table A2: Binary Probit Regression 
Endogenous 
Variable 
























































In parentheses z-ratios based on heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors,  
* (**) [***] significant at 90% (95%) [99%]-level. 
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Table A3: Ordered Logit and Ordered Probit Regressions for Price Increase 




















In parentheses z-ratios based on heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors,  
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